ລູກ​ເຮືອ​ເຮ​ລິ​ຄອບ​ເຕີ​ຂອງ​ກອງ​ທັບ​ຢູ​ເຄ​ຣນ​ອາດ​ຈະ​ຕົກ​ຢູ່​ໃນ​ບັນ​ຫາ​ໃຫຍ່​ຖ້າ​ຫາກ​ຣັດ​ເຊຍ​ໂຈມ​ຕີ

On paper, Ukrainian army aviation oversees four aviation brigades with Mi-8 transport helicopters and Mi-24 gunships.

In reality, wartime losses and a lack of cash mean just 30 or so of each type are capable of day-to-day operations—a number that’s adequate to equip maybe half the brigades.

If Russia widens its war in Ukraine, as many observers fear is increasingly likely, Ukraine’s beleaguered helicopter force might not last long in combat. Assuming it plays any direct role at all.

Officially, the 11th, 12th, 16th and 18th Separate Aviation Brigades are on the army’s books. The 11th is in the south. The 12th and 16th fly from bases in the west. Just one brigade, the 18th, is east of the Dnieper River, placing it within easy reach of the trench-lines in the separatist-controlled Donbas region.

Of these, only the 11th and 16th are fully equipped, according to a 2020 report by Alex Mladenovສະຫມາຊິກ "Each of these has an active fleet of no less than 10 Mi-24s in addition to about 15 Mi-8[s].”

Do the math. If the latest survey from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies is accurate, the 11th and 16th’s allotments leave no more than 15 Mi-24s and 23 Mi-8s for the other two brigades ແລະ for the air force, which operates transport helicopters for search-and-rescue and other duties.

This meager force actually represents a major improvement compared to just eight years ago. The Ukrainian army was a hollow force when Russian troops seized Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in February 2014 and subsequently backed separatists in Donbas.

The army mobilized what forces it could and dragged old, ex-Soviet aircraft out of storage. Maj. Gen. Ihor Yaremenko, chief of army aviation, in 2019 said his helicopter inventory had grown several times over, implying that just a couple dozen rotorcraft were available at the start of the crisis in 2014.

That tiny force suffered enormous casualties as rusty crews flew rusty aircraft through deadly Russian air-defenses. Five Mi-24s and five Mi-8s were destroyed. Another Mi-8 crashed in an accident. Three more Mi-24s and four Mi-8s were badly damaged.

The losses compelled Kyiv to withdraw its aircraft from Donbas in 2015. An agreement with Russia prevents their return, but Yaremenko said that could change. “In case of large-scale aggression, we will use aviation.”

Army aviation has been training for that eventuality. Mi-8s have participated in large-scale exercises, including some that included U.S. troops. In addition, Ukraine provides helicopters to the United Nations peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Air ops over Congo double as combat training for crews.

Ukraine is upgrading aging, Soviet-vintage airframes with new electronics, satellite-navigation and night-vision goggles for their crews. But these modest enhancements might not make much of a difference as long as the Russian army massing along the Ukrainian border can deploy literally hundreds of modern air-defense systems.

In theory, Ukraine’s Mi-24s would provide close-air-support to tank and infantry battalions while the Mi-8s would land paratroopers, resupply front-line units and help casualties to evacuate.

In reality, they might not be able to perform any of these missions—at least not for long. A fairly thin Russian air-defense network destroyed nearly half of Ukraine’s helicopters in the span of just a few months back in 2014 and 2015.

Today Russia’s air-defenses are much denser. Ukraine has more and better rotorcraft, but they face even greater danger along the front.